Common Forms of Housing Discrimination
In this section, learn about common forms of housing discrimination and what they can look like.
22. Massachusetts law prohibits discrimination in housing because a child or children will occupy the rented premises, but exempts: (1) two-family owner-occupied buildings; (2) buildings with three or fewer units if one unit "is occupied by an elderly or infirm person for whom the presence of children would constitute a hardship"; and (3) a temporary rental (less than one year) of the owner’s principal place of residence. G.L. c. 151B, §§4(11)(1)-(11)(3). These exemptions, however, do not apply to §4(7B)'s ban on discriminatory statements and advertising, nor do they apply to persons whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions. See 804 C.M.R. §§2.01(4)(b)-(4)(c).
The federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3602(k), 3604, and 3606, forbids housing discrimination based on "familial status." "Familial status" was added by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The federal law does not apply to owner-occupants of one- to four-family homes (the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemption). 42 U.S.C. §3603(b)(2); 24 C.F.R. §100.10(c)(2). The rental or sale of a single-family house by an owner who has not sold a house within the previous 24 months, who does not own more than three single-family houses, who does not use a real estate agent or broker to sell or rent the house, and who does not use a discriminatory advertisement, is also exempt from the Act. 42 U.S.C. §3603(b)(1); 24 C.F.R. §100.10(c)(1). Similar to Massachusetts law, the Fair Housing Act's ban on discriminatory statements and advertising (contained in 42 U.S.C. §3604(c)) is not subject to these exemptions. 42 U.S.C. §3603(b). Moreover, even where a landlord does have an exemption, the landlord's broker may not legally discriminate against children. See 42 U.S.C. §3605.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §3602(k); 804 C.M.R. §2.02(2); see also Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1187-90 (7th Cir. 1991). See also, G.L. c. 186, § 16, stating that any lease or rental agreement that terminates the contract if the tenant has or will have a child is void and against public policy.
24. See G.L. c. 151B §4(11)(2). A landlord is also allowed to exclude children where a dwelling contains three apartments or less and one of the units is occupied by an elderly or infirm person for whom the presence of children would constitute a hardship. G.L. c. 151B, §4(11)(1). The law also allows children to be excluded when a landlord temporarily leases (for up to one year) a single-family residence or unit that the landlord ordinarily occupied as their principal residence. G.L. c. 151B §4(11)(2).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§3607(b)(1)-(3). The Massachusetts law prohibiting housing discrimination against families with children does not specifically exempt housing for older person, see G.L. c. 151B §4(11); however, the prohibition against housing discrimination based on age does contain such a limitation. See G.L. c. 151B §§4(6)-(7).
26. See 42 U.S.C. §3604(c); G.L. c. 151B, §4(7B).
27. See 42 U.S.C. §3605; G.L. c. 151B, §4(3B).
28. The Massachusetts Lead Poisoning Prevention and Control statute is at G.L. c. 111, §190. The law requires all owners of residential buildings to remove or cover lead paint in places where a child under the age of six lives or seeks to live. The law specifically applies to an owner who tries to avoid lead paint liability by discriminating against a family with children, even if that family does not yet reside in the apartment or house. G.L. c. 111, §199A.
G.L. c. 151B, §4(11) specifically obligates the Mass. Commission Against Discrimination or a court which finds discrimination against families with children because of the presence of lead paint to refer such cases to the director of the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program which is located in Boston.
29. G.L. c. 111, §197(h) states that an owner undertaking lead abatement work may “reasonably delay the commencement of [a] tenancy” by up to 30 days. However, federal law prohibits providing housing on different terms and conditions, 42 U.S.C. §3604(b). The date a property is available for rental is a term and condition of the tenancy/rental. To the extent that the Massachusetts Lead Law conflicts with the requirement of the federal FHA, the federal statute preempts state law. See Astralis Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Warren v. Delvista Towers Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 49 F.Supp. 3d 1082, 1088-89 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
30. However, depending on the reason for the question, it may be possible for a landlord or their agent to inquire about the age of children who may be tenants. At least one court has upheld the decision of a HUD Administrative Law Judge who concluded that the Fair Housing Act was not violated when a real estate agent asked a prospective tenant about the number and age of their children in order to secure a quiet neighbor for an existing elderly tenant. Soules v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 967 F2d 817 (2nd Cir. 1992).
31. Two federal acts require landlords, including landlords with units paid for by Section 8 vouchers, to inspect apartments in which children live or will live for lead paint. See 42 U.S.C. §§4821-4846 (the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act) and 42 U.S.C. §4851 (Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992). See also Voucher Program Guidebook: Housing Choice, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/…;
The EOHLC policy was, in part, a reaction to the holding in the case of Ayala v. Boston Housing Auth., 404 Mass. 689 (1989), which held that the Boston Housing Authority had a duty to inspect a Section 8 unit for lead paint and might be liable for a child's poisoning in a unit that it failed to inspect. The court also held that the tenants were third-party beneficiaries of the contracts between BHA and the landlord and could thus sue for breach of those contracts. If a landlord denies you housing because you are a Section 8 recipient and the rules of the program demand that they delead the unit, then they may be discriminating on the basis of your receipt of a rental subsidy in violation of G.L. c. 151B, §4(10), which prohibits discrimination " … because of any requirement of such … rental assistance or housing subsidy program." If the discrimination was based on the receipt of rental assistance, then the exemption for owner-occupants of two-family homes does not apply. No owner can discriminate on this basis.
32. See G.L. c. 111, § 197 (requiring landlords to remove, abate, or contain lead paint in a unit rented to a family with children under six years of age.) As noted in n.29, state law states that if there is not yet an executed lease, the landlord may delay the start of the tenancy, no longer than thirty days, to delead the apartment, G.L. c. 111, § 197(h), however, this provision cannot justify a violation of 42 U.S.C. §3604(b).
33. It is also illegal for landlords to refuse to accept Section 8 or any rental assistance subsidy. See G.L. c. 151B, § 4(10).
34. 42 U.S.C. §3604(b), as amended by the 1988 Act, explicitly forbids discrimination against any person "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of … familial status." In Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court held that a landlord's refusal to rent a one-bedroom unit to a person with a child, or a two-bedroom unit to a person with three children, violates the Fair Housing Act since the landlord had rented these apartments to childless households of the same size.
35. See 42 U.S.C. §3607(b)(1); G.L. 151B, §4(11). Also, see the State Sanitary Code, 1054 C.M.R. §410.420(D), requiring 150 feet of floor space for the first occupant, and 100 square feet for each additional occupant with 50 square feet per person for shared bedrooms
36. A national study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), found that African-American and Latine/Hispanic people looking for rental apartments are still discriminated against in cities across the country. Turner et al., Housing Discrimnation Against Racial and Ethnic Minorities 2012 (Washington, DC, HUD 2013), available at ; see also Langowski et al, Qualified Renters Need Not Apply Race and Voucher Discrimination in the Metro Boston Rental Housing Market (July 2020) (finding that evidence of discrimination based on race in 71% of tests), available at https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/news/2020/law-news/rental_housing_study_july2020.pdf?la=en&hash=B0FFF5916ECA23DFD054170DA223780EDA571241.
37. All of the 2020 Census data relating to Massachusetts can be found at https://www.sec.state.ma.us/census2020/index.html. See also Race, Place, and Segregation: Redrawing the Color Line in Our Nation's Metros, a study by the Civil Rights Project, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, CommUNIRY 2000, and The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities (2002), available at: http://www.civilrights.org/publications/community2000/metro_open_comm.html.
38. See, e.g., Soules v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) (inquiries about an applicant’s race may violate the Fair Housing Act because “[t]here is simply no legitimate reason for considering an applicant's race”). However, it may be permissible to ask applicants about their citizenship status, if such inquiries are performed uniformly on all applicants. Espinoza v. Hillwool Square Mutual Ass'n., 522 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding that the Fair Housing Act does not per se prohibit citizenship requirements but where a citizenship requirement is pretext for national origin discrimination, it is unlawful). For more see Immigration status and affordable housing at https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing-apartments-shelter/public-subsidized-housing/immigration-status-and-affordable-housing.
39. G.L. c. 151B, §4(10).
40. See Diliddo v. Oxford Street Realty, 450 Mass. 66 (2007). In Diliddo, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a one-month termination provision in an alternative housing vouching program (AHVP) lease was a "requirement" of the AHVP program which the landlord's agent could not reject for financial reasons. In so holding, the Court refused to read into the statute an exception that would allow landlords to reject participants in housing subsidy programs whose requirements might cause the landlord economic harm. See also Clemons v. Niedzwiecki, Western Housing Court, 15-CV-0488 (Fein, J., July 25, 2016) (holding that Chapter 151B’s prohibition against denying housing because the tenant received a housing subsidy or because of the rules of a housing subsidy program includes a prohibition against refusing to rent to tenants because of the particular agency that administers their voucher).
41. See the regulation for the Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. §982.304, Illegal Discrimination: PHA Assistance to Family. This section states: "A family may claim that illegal discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, familial status or disability prevents the family from finding or leasing a suitable unit with assistance under the program. The PHA must give the family information on how to fill out and file a housing discrimination complaint." See also 24 C.F.R. §982.53, describing the equal opportunity requirements under the Section 8 program. Finally, note that the Equal Opportunity Housing Plan must, in accordance with the requirements of Executive Order 11063, 27 FR 11527, reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.S. §1982, "promote the abandonment of discriminatory practices" and "prevent discrimination."
42. Ch. 151B, §1(16), (17), and §4(3C), (4A), (6)-(7B). In federal law, the key provisions are in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, §13(a), 102 Stat. 1636 (1988), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq. Both the state and federal law add persons with disabilities to the list of those protected against discrimination. Both laws, with the state law being generally stronger, provide that landlords must make "reasonable accommodations" to persons with disabilities so that they can rent and enjoy housing on an equal basis with those who are not disabled.
Another federal law protecting disabled people from housing discrimination, but only in "federally assisted" housing, is Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. §794.
43. G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A)(1); 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(A).
44. “[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); see also Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of Hous. Ct. Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 847, 120 N.E.3d 297, 314 (2019) (citing McDonough, 457 Mass. at 514, 528, 930 N.E.2d 1279, quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516, 524, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004))( noting that disability rights laws “exist to address the ‘pervasive unequal treatment’ of individuals with disabilities,” who “have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society.’”
45. See Kachadorian v. Larson, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 1111, *2 (Mar. 23, 2015) (Appeals Court Rule 1:28.).
46. Ch. 151B, §1(16), (17), and §4(3C), (4A), (6)-(7B). In federal law, the key provisions are in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, §13(a), 102 Stat. 1636 (1988), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq. Both the state and federal law add persons with disabilities to the list of those protected against discrimination. Both laws provide that landlords must make "reasonable accommodations" to persons with disabilities so that they can rent and enjoy housing on an equal basis with those who are not disabled.
Another federal law protecting disabled people from housing discrimination, and providing for affirmative rights to accommodations is Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. §794. Section 504 only applies in "federally assisted" housing.
47. G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A); 42 U.S.C. §3604(f).
48. State law, at G.L. c. 151B, §1(17), uses the same definition of "handicap" as the federal Fair Housing Act does. The federal Fair Housing Act and implementing regulations define "handicap" as (1) a "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [a] person's major life activities," (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such impairment. 42 U.S.C. §3602(h); 24 C.F.R §100.201. Section 504 has a similar definition. See 29 U.S.C. §§705(9)(B), 705(20).
Note that the federal law does not include as a "handicap" the current illegal use of or an addiction to a controlled substance. 42 U.S.C. §3602(h)(3), 24 C.F.R. §100.201. This should be differentiated from alcohol use disorder. To the extent someone is disabled due to alcohol use disorder, that disability remains covered by the fair housing laws. Moreover, individuals with substance use disorder would not be excluded if they do not currently use illegal drugs. See House Judiciary Comm., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 28-29, reprinted at 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2173, 2183-84.) The question of what constitutes “current” has not been squarely answered by legislation or the courts as of this edition. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing exclusion in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) for "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance"); see also Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 418 Mass. 603, 638 N.E.2d 906, 6 A.D.D. 464 (1994) (finding exclusion applied where tenant had recent conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and citing congressional record stating “The current use provision was “not intended to be limited to persons who use drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or weeks before, the action in question.”). Many of the cases evaluating what is “current illegal drug use” have been in the context of local efforts to exclude sober homes or recovery programs. See, e.g., Pacific Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1156, 28 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1344 (9th Cir. 2013) (“It is well established that persons recovering from drug and/or alcohol addiction are disabled under the FHA and therefore protected from housing discrimination.”); Toucan Partners, LLC v. Hernando County, Fla., 571 Fed. Appx. 737, 742 n.4 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that “those recovering from drug addiction are protected under the [Fair Housing Act]”); Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v. Board of Sup'rs of Palmyra Tp., 455 F.3d 154, 156 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended, (Aug. 31, 2006) (noting with approval Fair Housing Act cases holding that “recovering alcoholics and drug addicts are handicapped, so long as they are not currently using illegaldrugs”).
Also, the federal law is explicit that discrimination protections are not to extend to any individual whose tenancy would constitute a "direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others." 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(9); 24 C.F.R. §100.202(d). In contrast, the state law, G.L. c. 151B, includes no language exempting such persons from protection against discrimination. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a public housing authority may evict a tenant who requests a reasonable accommodation but poses a threat to others, but before doing so it must show that an attempt to accommodate the tenant has failed or that there is no reasonable accommodation that will acceptably minimize the risk to other residents. Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 841 (2009).
49. It is also illegal to refuse to rent to a person because they might need reasonable accommodations to the premises or to refuse to allow a tenant to make reasonable modifications to their apartment. Both the federal law (42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3) and 24 C.F.R. §100.203) and state law (G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A) and 804 CMR §2.03(3)) require owners to allow disabled tenants to make reasonable modifications to their units at their own expense. This might include widening a doorway, installing a grab bar, putting in a louder doorbell, or lowering the light switches. However, the state law goes further for publicly assisted, multiple-dwelling or other larger housing developments. In those forms of housing, reasonable modifications must be paid for by the owner (in the case of public housing, this is subject to appropriation), but modifications are not considered reasonable if they would impose undue hardship on the owner. Also, reasonable modifications do not include ramping for more than five steps or installing a wheelchair lift. G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A)(1) and (7A)(3). Under §504, the only limit on provision of reasonable accommodations including structural modifications is undue financial and administrative burden. See 24 C.F.R. §20 et seq. Thus, §504, if available, may be the better route for structural modifications in certain situations.
State law says that a modification is not required "if it would impose an undue hardship upon the owner. … Factors to be considered shall include, but not be limited to, the nature and cost of the accommodation or modification needed, the extent to which the accommodation or modification would materially alter the marketability of the housing, the overall size of the housing business of the owner … and the ability of the owner … to recover the cost … through a federal tax deduction." G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A)(3).
50. HUD has also issued lengthy guidance on when a tenant may be entitled to an assistance animal (sometimes called an emotional support animal) or a service animal. See HUD, Office of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Notice FHEO-2020-01 (Jan. 28, 2020), available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/HUDAsstAnimalNC1-28-2020….
Service animals are defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA ) to be: “any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual's disability.” 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104; 36.104.
Assistance animals, or emotional support animals, are animals that provide support to a disabled person – whether it be physical or emotional support – but do not need to specifically be dogs. HUD describes assistance animals as “other trained or untrained animals that do work, perform tasks, provide assistance, and/or provide therapeutic emotional support for individuals with disabilities.” FHEO-2020-01, p. 1.
51. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 841 (2009); Glendale Assocs. v. Harris, 97 Mass.App.Ct. 454 (2020); Moretalara v. Boston Hous. Auth., 99 Mass.App.Ct. 1 (2020); Peterborough Hous. Assocs., LP v. Garnier, 99 Mass.App.Ct. 1114 (2021) (M.A.C. Rule 23.0).
52. Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act (May 17, 2004).
53. Id.
54. See City Wide Assocs. v. Penfield, 409 Mass. 140, 143-44 (1991).
55. 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(9); Andover Housing Authority v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 312 (2005) (neighbors' rights need not be "sacrificed 'on the altar' of reasonable accommodation") (quoting Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1046 (6th Cir. 2001)). In Andover Housing Authority v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300 (2005), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a public housing authority did not violate the Fair Housing Act and M.G.L. c. 151B when it evicted a tenant with an alleged mental disability for excessive noise, and that the tenant's requested withdrawal or delay of eviction proceedings was not reasonable. Relying on language appearing in §504 of the Rehabilitation Act (but not in the Fair Housing Act or M.G.L. c. 151B), the Court focused on whether the tenant was a "qualified" handicapped person and concluded he was not. According to the Court, "[i]n the public housing context, a 'qualified' handicapped individual is one who could meet the authority's eligibility requirements for occupancy and who could meet the conditions of a tenancy, with a reasonable accommodation or modification in the authority's rules, policies, practices, or services. Here, the tenants made no showing that, even if eviction proceedings were withdrawn or delayed, they could comply with the terms of their lease by not disturbing their neighbors." 443 Mass. at 310-311 (internal citations omitted).
But see Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 850 (2009)) (“before a public housing authority may terminate the lease of a disabled tenant . . . because he poses ‘a significant risk to the health or safety of others’ that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation . . . the housing authority ‘must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk’”) (internal citations omitted).
56. See Rodriguez v. Montalvo, 337 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215-16 (D. Mass. 2004).
57. 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3); G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A)(1). Under Massachusetts law, an owner must pay for reasonable accommodations "in the case of publicly assisted housing, multiple dwelling housing consisting of ten or more units, or contiguously located housing consisting of ten or more units…." G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A)(1).
58. 29 U.S.C. §794.
59. See G.L. c. 151B, §4(7A).
60. United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 847-48 (2009)(“ To make a reasonable accommodation request, no “magic” words are required.”); Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act (May 17, 2004) (noting that a housing provider cannot require use of a specific form, that the requester need not “mention the [FHA] or use the words "reasonable accommodation’” so long as a reasonable person would understand that a reasonable accommodation is being requested).
62. Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act (May 17, 2004)(“[H]ousing providers must give appropriate consideration to reasonable accommodation requests even if the requester makes the request orally or does not use the provider's preferred forms or procedures for making such requests.”).
63. Id.
64. Id. (“If a person's disability is obvious, or otherwise known to the provider, and if the need for the requested accommodation is also readily apparent or known, then the provider may not request any additional information about the requester's disability or the disability-related need for the accommodation.”).
65. Glendale Assocs. v. Harris, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 463 (2020).
66. Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833, 847-48 (2009).
67. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005).
68. U.S. Dep’t of Hou. & Urb. Dev., Office of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Memorandum on Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination against Victims of Domestic Violence under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)(Feb. 9, 2011), available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/FHEODOMESTICVIOLGUIDENG.PDF.
69. Massachusetts law provides certain protections for victims of domestic violence allowing them to break a lease early and request that the locks be changed (for a reasonable fee). G.L. c. 186, §§24, 26. In both cases, the landlord may request proof that the individual is a victim of domestic violence, such as a copy of a court prevention of abuse order or a police report. The law also provides that if a victim of domestic violence exercises his right to terminate his lease early due to domestic violence, a future landlord cannot use that as a reason not to rent to him, nor can a housing subsidy provider use that as a basis to deny rental assistance. G.L. c. 186, §25.
70. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.2001-5.2011.
71. M.G.L. c. 151B, §§4(6), (7), (7B), (8).
73. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, Implementation of Executive Order 13988 on the Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act (Feb. 11, 2021)(that “the Fair Housing Act's sex discrimination provisions are comparable to those of Title VII and that they likewise prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity”), at https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/HUD_Memo_EO13988.pdf. This memo was likely rescinded pursuant to Executive Order titled “Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions” which rescinded Executive Order 13988. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218, 2020 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 220638, 104 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 46540 (2020).
74. Langowski, Berman, Holloway & McGinn, Transcending Prejudice: Gender Identity and Expression-Based Discrimination in the Metro Boston Rental Market, 29 Yale J.L. & Feminism 321 (2018); see also Urban Institute, A Paired-Testing Pilot Study of Housing Discrimination against Same-Sex Couples and Transgender Individuals (2017).
75. A housing provider violates the federal Fair Housing Act when the provider’s policy or practice has an unjustified discriminatory effect, even when the provider had no intent to discriminate. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2522-23 (June 25, 2015) (holding that a policy may be considered discriminatory if it “function[s] unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification”); see also Burbank Apts. Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 474 Mass. 107 (2015). Where a policy or practice that restricts access to housing on the basis of criminal record has a disparate impact on individuals of a particular race, national origin, or other protected status, such policy or practice is unlawful under the Fair Housing Act. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of General Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to the Use of Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real Estate-Related Transactions (April 4, 2016).See also U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Notice PIH 2015-19, Guidance for Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) and Owners of Federally-Assisted Housing on Excluding the Use of Arrest Records in Housing Decisions (Nov. 2, 2015) (prohibiting landlords who receive federal funding from relying on arrest records only to deny admission to or evict tenants).
76. See Louis v. SafeRent Solutions, LLC, 985 F.Supp.3d 19, 39 (D. Mass. July 26, 2023) (plaintiffs sufficiently pled disparate impact claim that a scoring system relying heavily on credit history disproportionately impacted voucher holders and other protected classes).
77. See City Life Vida Urbana, Evictions in Boston: The Disproportionate Effects of Forced Moves on Communities of Color (2020); see also Peter Hepburn et al., Racial and Gender Disparities among Evicted Americans, Sociologic Science, Dec. 16, 2020, at 649-53 (“Black individuals were overrepresented in the evicted defendant population. They made up 19.9 percent of all adult renters but 32.7 percent of all eviction filing defendants. Four out of every five black renters in our sample (81.0 percent) lived in a county in which the share of eviction filings against black renters was higher than the share of the renting population that was black. All other racial/ethnic groups were underrepresented, with the largest absolute difference among white renters. White renters made up 51.5 percent of all adult renters but only 42.7 percent of all eviction filing defendants.”); Sandra Park, Unfair Eviction Screening Policies Are Disproportionately Blacklisting Black Women, ACLU (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/womens-rights/unfair-eviction-screening-policies-are-disproportionately (“[S]tudies demonstrated that people of color made up about 80 percent of those facing eviction in several cities, and women were 62 percent of the tenants facing eviction in Chicago and 70 percent of the tenants in Philadelphia.”).
78. This section addresses only the disability laws regarding private housing. The laws regarding public and subsidized housing are different and can be more complicated.
In addition, sometimes a person will have a CORI (or a poor credit report) because they are survivor of domestic violence. If this is the case, you should explain the circumstances to the landlord. It may be sex discrimination to deny someone housing based on a CORI or poor credit report that is the result of someone’s being a victim of domestic violence. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination against Victims of Domestic Violence under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (Feb. 9, 2011).
79. See endnote 20 above.
80. Id.
81. Much work has been done on the ways in which the lack of appropriate, affordable, available medical care and supportive services for people with serious mental illness results in unconscionably high levels of incarceration for this population. See, e.g., Peter Insel, Healing: Our Path from Mental Illness to Mental Health (2022).
82. 42 U.S.C. §3602(h); Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 418 Mass. 603 (1994).
83. The fair housing laws do not give a definition of current use of illegal drugs. What constitutes current versus former use — and thus entitled to coverage as a disability under the fair housing laws — is a fact-specific question. See, e.g., Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 418 Mass. 603 (1994) (citing United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that the applicable fact in the case was that the tenant was alleged to have possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and thus the question of whether the tenant was or was not “currently” using was not at issue). But see Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608–09 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that use four months’ previous was removed enough to not constitute “current” use). The Americans with Disabilities Act may provide some guidance on how courts may analyze the question. It defines current use of drugs as "illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem." 28 C.F.R. §35.104. In addition, state regulations regarding state-aided public and subsidized housing states that "[a] person's illegal use of a controlled substance within the preceding 12 months shall create a presumption that such person is a current illegal user of a controlled substance, but the presumption may be overcome by a convincing showing that the person has permanently ceased all illegal use of controlled substances. This disqualification of current illegal users of controlled substances shall not apply to applicants for housing provided through a treatment program for illegal users of controlled substances." 760 CMR §5.08(1)(k).