Important Legal Defenses and Counterclaims
Notas finales
In an eviction case, you get to respond to what your landlord tells the court. You respond through a court document called an Answer. The Answer tells the court your side of the story and includes defenses and counterclaims.
123. G.L. c. 239, §8A.
124. Your landlord must file their Notice to Quit with the summons and complaint. U.S.P.R. 2(d).
125. Williams v. Seder, 306 Mass. 134, 137 (1940).
126. G.L. c. 239 § 15 (while this is not a full defense to the case, the court should not enter judgment against you or issue an execution until your rental assistance application has been approved or denied.) See Grant Manor LP v. Beasley, Eastern Housing Court, No. 23-H84-SP-4787 (Kelleher, F.J. Feb. 8, 2024); Martin v. Sprague, Central Housing Court, No. 24-H85-SP-491 (Central Housing Court March 29, 2024). But note that where prior applications had been denied, at least one court has held that a judge can determine whether to grant a stay based on the likelihood that the tenancy will be preserved through rental assistance. Corcoran Mgt. Co v. Sharifnoor, Eastern Housing Court, No. 23-H84-SP-4230 (Bagdoian, J. Feb. 9, 2024). Another judge denied a stay where rental assistance would not cover the tenant’s entire balance. Beacon Residential Mgt. v. Mateo, Western Housing Court, No. 24-H79-SP-577 (Adeyinka, J. April 29, 2024).
127. Bedford Village Preservation Associates, v. Pilat, Northeast Housing Court, No. 20-H77-SP-1316 (Mitchell-Munevar, J. Aug. 8, 2022); Martin v. Ventura, Central Housing Court, No. 23-H85-SP-2552 (Mitchell-Munevar, J. Aug. 10, 2023).
128. U.S.P.R. 2(d) commentary. Although tenants at will can be evicted for no cause, the complaint should at least allege that a valid Notice to Quit has expired.
129. Prop. Mgmt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542 (2018) (property managers do not have standing to bring evictions unless they are the property owner or the lessor.); David A. Brossi LLC v. Bordes, Central Housing Court, No. 23-H85-SP-3451 (Mitchell-Munevar, J. Oct. 12, 2023); Sciasca v. Wilt, Northeast Housing Court, No. 20-H77-SP-2443 (Mitchell-Munevar, J. Nov. 1, 2021) (property manager lacked standing); Taylor Realty Tr. v. Johnson, Northeast Housing Court, No. 21-H77-SP-2377 (Mitchell-Munevar, J. Nov. 5, 2021)(trustee, not trust, had standing).
130. Corcoran v. Jervis, Eastern Housing Court, No. 17-H84-SP-3566 (Theophilis, J. Sept. 7, 2018).
131. G.L. c. 239 § 15.
132. Porter v. Merrill, 124 Mass. 534, 541 (1878).
133. Paeff v. Hawkins-Washington Realty, 320 Mass. 144, 145 (1946); Saxeney v. Panis, 239 Mass. 207, 210 (1921); Nelson Theater Co. v. Nelson, 216 Mass. 30, 34 (1913); Anderson v. Lissandri, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 196 (1985); Roberts Milford Assocs. & Rolling Green Management v. Weaver, Worcester Superior Court, 84-29046 (Travers, Jr., J., Mar. 5, 1985); Allen Park Assocs. v. Lewandowski, Hampden Housing Court, 99-RD-9400-9 (Abrashkin, J., May 8, 1989) (landlord accepted rent from tenant for several years while knowing tenant owned a dog, did not object, and allowed other tenants to keep pets without objection; landlord has waived objection to tenant's dog despite a no-pet clause in lease); Cardaropoli v. Panagos, Hampden Housing Court, SP-3144-S-84 (Peck, Jr., J., June 4, 1984).
134. Evidence of oral consent would generally not be admissible if it took place before or at the time of the signing of a written lease.
135. See M.J.G. Properties v. Hurley, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 250 (1989); Tage II v. Ducas (U.S.) Realty Corp., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 664 (1984).
136. London v. Tebo, 246 Mass. 360, 362-63 (1923) (acceptance of rent does not waive landlord's right to terminate for a continuing breach, which here was the tenant's covenant to repair); Corcoran Management Co. v. Withers, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 736 (1987) (landlord's acceptance of rent without reservation of rights did not establish new tenancy where tenant had received numerous notices from landlord that his conduct was considered to be in violation of lease and where tenant signed agreement that provided that acceptance of rent for use and occupation shall not be deemed as a waiver).
137. Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93 (1962); Globe Leather & Shoe Findings, Inc. v. Golburgh, 339 Mass. 380 (1959) (renewal of month-to-month tenancy by acceptance of rent); Mulcahy & Dean, Inc. v. Hanley, 332 Mass. 232, 235 (1955) (sublet breach); Kaplan v. Flynn, 255 Mass. 127 (1926) (renewal equitably blocks forfeiture of lease); CMJ Management Co. v. Paris, Boston Housing Court, 96-03148 (Winik, J., Nov. 22, 1996); Cardaropoli v. Panagos, Hampden Housing Court, SP-3144-S-84 (Peck, Jr., J., June 4, 1984).
138. Mulcahy & Dean, Inc. v. Hanley, 332 Mass. 232, 236 (1955) (sublet breach).
139. Howard D. Johnson Co. v. Madigan, 361 Mass. 454 (1972); Atkins v. Chilson, 52 Mass. 112 (1846); Goldstein v. Tarantino, Norfolk Superior Court, 85-69 (Elam, J., July 3, 1985); Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833 (2009).
If you bring up the fact that you have a disability and need an accommodation to be able to defend against the eviction, the court should grant those accommodations. Adjartey v. Central Div. of Housing Court Dept., 481 Mass. 830 (2019).
140. Cheuk v. Chase, No. 03-SP-02369 (Boston Housing Ct. (Winik, J., July 8, 2003); Cruz Management v. Celado, Boston Housing Court, No. 09-SP-2567 (Winik, J., Aug. 19, 2009); Father Martin Cooperative Homes v. Berry, Boston Housing Court, No. 02-SP-00248 (Edwards, J., Oct. 15, 2002); Diletizia v. Mackie, Boston Housing Court, No. 01-SP-05825 (Winik, J., Jan. 4, 2002); The Community Builders, Inc. v. Scarcella, Boston Housing Court, No. 11-SP-1756 (Muirhead, J July 20, 2011) (exclusion of wrongdoing household member would have been sufficient if court could rely on such exclusion); Chicopee Housing Authority v. Maldonado, Hampden Housing Court, No. SP-2682-C87 (Abrashkin, J., May 27, 1987) Rogerson House, Inc. v. O'Brien, Boston Housing Court, SP No. 33105 (Nov. 5, 1984); Maloney Props., Inc. v. Simon, Boston Housing Court, No. 96-SP-00174 (Winik, J., May 24, 1996); Benchmark Apartment Management v. Williams, Boston Housing Court, No. 96-SP-02621 (Winik, J., June 3, 1996).
141. Counterclaims in summary process are not compulsory. U.S.P.R. 5.
142. G.L. c. 239, §8A.
143. G.L. c. 239, §8A.
144. G.L. c. 239, §8A. There are several possible rationales for this defense. One is that the plain language of G.L. c. 239, §8A says that claims can be used as a defense. Another is that if the court awards the tenant any money on their counterclaims in a no-fault eviction that is not based on non-payment of rent, then the tenant will have recovered more money than the landlord and will retain possession under G.L. c. 239, §8A. A third possible rationale is that G.L. c. 239, §8A creates a "clean hands" doctrine that prohibits a landlord who has violated their tenant's rights from regaining possession in an eviction where the tenant is without fault.
145. Spence v. O'Brien, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 489 (1983). This case did not define "fault," but made it clear that it is more than any "cause" and must involve "wrongdoing" or the toleration of another's "wrongdoing."
G.L. c. 239, § 8A does not provide a counterclaim if the tenancy is terminated for fault or the property was not rented to the occupant. SeeMastropietro v. Rodriguez Robles, Northeast Housing Court, No. 17-H77-SP-5540 (Kerman, J. Feb. 12, 2018); Nicholas v. Nicholas, Eastern Housing Court, No. 17-H84-SP-4674 (Winik, F.J. May 22, 2018).
146. TTFN Corp. v. Tannian,Eastern Housing Court, No. 18-H84-SP-3837 (Bagdoian, J. Dec. 14, 2018).
147. Ednson Realty Trust v. Robinson, Hampden Housing Court, 88-SP-7252-C (Abrashkin, J., Nov. 21, 1988). In Ednson Realty, the court rejected a landlord's claim that G.L. c. 239, §8A precludes counterclaims in fault-based evictions. The court noted that §8A and U.S.P.R. 5 state that counterclaims shall be permitted in no-fault cases, but do not say that they cannot be permitted in other cases. It also noted that other counterclaims are available outside of §8A and that courts retain discretion under U.S.P.R. 5 to sever those counterclaims where appropriate.
148. G.L. c. 239, §2A as amended by St. 1978, c. 149. This amendment added the requirement that the presumption of retaliation can be overcome only if the landlord presents "clear and convincing evidence."
The second part of this standard is often overlooked by the courts, but is very important, especially for tenants at will in a "no-fault" eviction, since it requires the landlord to prove a legitimate reason for the eviction. It is also important in cases where the tenant is "at fault." (For example, if your landlord claims that they are evicting you because you have a pet in violation of your tenancy agreement, but your landlord has known about the pet for a long time and didn't bring the eviction until you engaged in some protected activity, it would be very difficult for them to overcome the presumption of retaliation because they could have previously evicted you for the given reason.) See Collin v. Eldridge, Worcester Superior Court, 28794 (Oct. 23, 1984); Michel v. Monfiston, Boston Housing Court, 06-SP-1613 (Winik, J., June 21, 2006); Genovevo v. Gallagher, Hampden Housing Court, 94-SP-4371 (Abrashkin, J., May 17, 1995); Walker v. Lewis, Boston Housing Court, No. 14-SP-5223 (Muirhead, J., Feb. 4, 2015). But see Barretto-Morse v. Laiacona, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 141 (2014) (court finds that where the tenant made a complaint about poor housing conditions after receiving a 14 day Notice to Quit that tenant may not be entitled to a retaliation defense).
The retaliation defense under G.L. c. 239, §2A applies to all eviction cases, including non-payment of rent cases. Compare G.L. c. 186, §18 (sending Notice to Quit for non-payment of rent does not trigger presumption of retaliation). You may be able to use this defense successfully in a non-payment case where the landlord sent a Notice to Quit for non-payment shortly after your rent was due and within 6 months of your engaging in protected activities. Your claim would be stronger if your landlord usually waits a month or two for late rent before sending non-payment notices. However, there may be no retaliation defense if the tenant does not show that the owner was aware of a discrimination complaint prior to the eviction filing. See Albert Corp. v. Gove & Descoteaux, Eastern Housing Court, No. 19-H84-SP-4126 (Muirhead, F.J. Court Oct. 28, 2019).
149. Stone Run East Assocs. v. McDonald and Harrison, Quincy District Court, E-88-0002, E-88-0003 (Sept. 19, 1988). In Stone Run, a handicapped tenant raised a discrimination defense in an eviction brought by a landlord because the tenant allegedly interfered with the rights of other tenants and permitted unauthorized occupants to reside in the apartment in violation of the lease. The court rejected the landlord's claim that G.L. c. 239, §8A precluded the tenant's defenses in a fault-based eviction, holding that "the court cannot be in a position to assist a landlord in pursuing a discriminatory eviction. For purposes of this motion I must assume that there has been discrimination. If the defendant is able to establish that discrimination is the motive underlying the termination of the tenancy then it should be a bar to the action."
150. See East Boston Three Realty Trust v. Piantedosi, Boston Housing Court, 35497 (Martin, J., July 15, 1985); McDonagh v. Wible, Boston Housing Court, 36012 (Martin, J., July 12, 1985).
151. Discrimination, or failure to reasonably accommodate a tenant with a disability, may be raised as an affirmative defense to eviction and as a counterclaim. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 452 Mass. 833 (2009); Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300 (2005); City Wide Assocs. v. Penfield, 409 Mass. 140 (1991); Whittier Terrace Assocs. v. Hampshire, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 1020 (1989). But see FNHMC v. Gomez, Boston Housing Court, No. 12-SP-1497 (Winik, F.J., June 23, 2014) (a request for below market rent as an accommodation for a disabled person who is unable to work is not reasonable, unlike a situation where such a tenant obtained a subsidy which would assist them in paying the market rent).
152. City Wide Assocs. v. Penfield, 409 Mass. 140 (1991) (mentally handicapped tenant who caused damage to unit could not be evicted without reasonable accommodations). See also Sears v. Colson, Hampden Housing Court, 93-SP-3174 (Abrashkin, J., Jan. 12, 1993); Worcester Housing Authority v. Santis, Worcester Housing Court, 89-SP-0471 (Martin, J., Nov. 7, 1989).
153. Whittier Terrace Assocs. v. Hampshire, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 1020, 532 (1989) (rescript).
154. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(a)(3).
155. Definitions of abuse covered by VAWA (which incorporate by reference the definition of abuse in state law under G.L. c. 209A §1):
Domestic violence: felony or misdemeanor crimes committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim under the family or domestic violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant funding and, … includes the use or attempted use of physical abuse or sexual abuse, or a pattern of any other coercive behavior committed, enabled, or solicited to gain or maintain power and control over a victim, including verbal, psychological, economic, or technological abuse that may or may not constitute criminal behavior, by a person who—
- (A) is a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, or person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim;
- (B) is cohabitating, or has cohabitated, with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner;
- (C) shares a child in common with the victim; or
- (D) commits acts against a youth or adult victim who is protected from those acts under the family or domestic violence laws of the jurisdiction. See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(12).
Dating violence: violence committed by a person—
- (A) who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim; and
- (B) where the existence of such a relationship shall be determined based on a consideration of the following factors:
- (i)The length of the relationship.
- (ii)The type of relationship.
- (iii)The frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the relationship. See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(11).
Sexual assault: any nonconsensual sexual act proscribed by Federal, tribal, or State law, including when the victim lacks capacity to consent. See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(35).
Stalking: engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to—(A) fear for his or her safety or the safety of others; or (B) suffer substantial emotional distress. See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(36).
156. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(b)(1).
157. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(b)(3)(A).
158. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2)(C).
159. 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(2).
160. Id. See also New Bedford Hous. Auth. v. K.R., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 509, 515 (2020).
161. 24 C.F.R. § 5.2009(c) (HUD encourages housing providers to “undertake whatever actions permissible and feasible under their respective programs to assist individuals residing in their units who are victims… to remain in their units …and for the covered housing provider to bear the costs of any transfer, where permissible.”)
162. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Y.A., 482 Mass. 240 (2019).
163. Id.
164. See Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities Checklist of Required Verification Documents for Housing Situation Priority Status for “Abusive Situation”: Abusive situation needs to be documented through at least one or more of the following based upon the Applicant’s individual circumstances:
- medical reports
- police reports
- court reports
- applicant has attempted to get restraining order
- applicant has filed a civil or criminal complaint against accused
- letter from attorney stating case
- letter from counselor
- psychological report
- letter from social service agency
- detailed 3rd part written explanation of the circumstances that led to Applicant’s present housing situation
https://www.mass.gov/doc/more-information-about-homeless-priority-eligibility/download.
166. 760 C.M.R. § 6.06(4)(q) requires that an LHA must provide reasonable and appropriate assistance to tenants who are victims of domestic violence
167. G.L. c. 239 § 2A.
168. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184 (1973).
169. G.L. c. 239, §8A.
170. G.L. c. 239, §8A. No cases have specifically dealt with the definition of an "occupant" under the statute, but it apparently includes those who may not fit a strict definition of "tenant."
171. A landlord who sends only a 14-day notice for non-payment of rent cannot rely on any allegations of tenant fault since they would have been required to send a 30-day notice for fault-based eviction. Kahaly v. Sinke, Roxbury District Court, 12164 (Martin, Jr., J., Nov. 25, 1987).
172. See Weston Assocs. v. Roberts, No. 17-H84-SP-5397 (Eastern Housing Court Theophilis, J. Feb. 5, 2018) (Theophilis, J.); Trinity Mgmt. v. Roberson, Eastern Housing Court, No. 19-H84-SP-1298 (Theophilis, J. May 14, 2019).
173. G.L. c. 239, §8A allows a tenant or occupant to base a defense or counterclaim on any claim against the landlord that relates to the property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy. It is therefore possible to defend against a non-payment or no-fault eviction whenever your landlord has violated any term of your tenancy agreement, breached the warranty of habitability, or violated any relevant law or regulation. If the tenant's defense or counterclaim is based on the condition of the premises or services provided, the tenant must comply with the specific requirements specified in G.L. c. 239, §8A.
174. G.L. c. 239, §8A, ¶3 makes inspection reports prima facie evidence that a defense and counterclaim exist.
175. G.L. c. 239, §8A. The Board of Health is required to provide this certification on its inspection report. 105 C.M.R. §410.821(A)(8).
176. If a tenant can show notice of some conditions claims prior to rental arrears, but cannot show pre-arrears notice of other conditions claims, the tenant may still win a G.L. c. 239, § 8A defense. Gomes v. Castro & Valdez, Northeast Housing Court, No. 18-H84- SP-3032 (Michaud, J. Aug. 8, 2018).
177. McKenna v. Begin, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 168 (1975).
178. G.L. c. 239, §8A allows a tenant or occupant to base a defense or counterclaim on any claim against the landlord that relates to the property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy. It is therefore possible to defend against a non-payment or no-fault eviction whenever your landlord has violated any term of your tenancy agreement, breached the warranty of habitability, or violated any relevant law or regulation. If the tenant's defense or counterclaim is based on the condition of the premises or services provided, the tenant must comply with the specific requirements specified in G.L. c. 239, §8A.
179. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184 (1973).
180. Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 872-73 (1991).
181. G.L. c. 186, § 15B. Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207 (2015); Tringali v. O'Leary, 2015 Mass. App. Div. 110 (2015); Karaa v. Kuk Yim, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 714 (2014); Stacy v. Zhao, 2013 Mass. App. Div. 59 (2013); Gallo v. Marinelli, Boston Housing Court, No. 15-SP-1469 (Muirhead, J., May 19, 2015; June 8, 2015).
182. Mass. General Laws c. 186 §15B and/or actual or statutory damages under Mass. General Laws c. 93A. See, e.g., Sobers v. Taylor, Eastern Housing Court, No. 17-H84-SP-3886 (Theophilis, J. Apr. 12, 2018). But the tenant does not have a counterclaim where an owner returns the security deposit after the demand in a summary process answer. See Cruz v. Norat-Reyes, Western Housing Court, No. 17-H79-SP-181 (Fields, J. Mar. 1, 2017); Casserly Props. Land Tr. v. Green, Eastern Housing Court, No. 17-H84-SP-3820 (Theophilis, J. May 9, 2018).
183. G.L. c. 239, §8A. This is a very broad-based defense and includes Sanitary Code violations, breach of the warranty of habitability, breach of any material term of the rental agreement, or any violation of law related to the tenancy, such as a breach of quiet enjoyment or violation of the security deposit requirements. See Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207 (2015); Lawrence v. Osuaqwu, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 60 (2001); Amory Realty Trust v. Diaz, Boston Housing Court, 33820 (King, J., May 31, 1985).
184. G.L. c. 239, §8A. c. 186, §15B; and/or c. 93A
185. G.L. c. 186, § 14. See, e.g., Bermudez v. Anderson, Boston Housing Court, No. 12-SP-3505 (Muirhead, J., Apr. 5, 2013); Yuan v. Gero, Eastern Housing Court, No. 18-H84-SP-3535 (Muirhead, F.J. Aug. 22, 2018).
186. G.L. c. 186, §14; Shea v. Delaney, 2016 Mass. App. Div. 68 (it was a breach of quiet enjoyment for the landlord to enter the property without notice or permission and remove furniture belonging to the landlord and an award of $15,675.75 were not excessive.) But see Clark v. Leisure Woods Estates, Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 87 (2016) (manufactured home residents could recover only one triple rent award for operator’s quiet enjoyment violations.)
187. G.L. c. 186, §14. These damages can be lessened by a set-off claim by your landlord for rent due. Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91 (1982). In order for you to recover under G.L. c. 186, §14, the landlord does not have to intentionally try to disturb you; it is their conduct and not their intentions that is controlling. Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714 (1977). For example, the fact that an owner failed to provide heat because they could not afford to buy heating oil does not diminish the tenant's right to recover for the loss of "quiet enjoyment" that occurred during the time the apartment was unheated. Lowery v. Robinson, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 982 (1982). See also Homesavers Council of Greenfield Gardens v. Sanchez, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 453 (2007), for a full discussion of emotional distress damages under G.L. c. 186, §14.
188. Ferreira v. Charland, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 194 (2023) (landlord’s reimbursement for unlawful charge of water bills did not prevent the tenant from raising a defense and counterclaim based on the landlord’s conduct.)
189. Violations under G.L. c. 186, §14, includes: willful or intentional failure to provide utilities required by the law or the rental agreement; cutting off tenant's utilities; transferring responsibility of payment for utilities to tenant without tenant's knowledge or consent; moving tenant out or changing the locks without a court order; and interfering with tenant's ability to enjoy the home in any other way.
190. G.L. c. 186, §14.
191. Homesavers Council of Greenfield Gardens, Inc. v. Sanchez, 770 Mass.App.Ct. 453 (2007); Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91 (1982).
192. The Consumer Protection Act, G.L. c. 93A, was explicitly extended to cover owners and tenants by St. 1971, Chapter 241, approved by the Legislature on April 29, 1971. The 1971 amendment gave the protection of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act to "any person who purchases or leases goods or services, real or personal, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." The next year the Legislature passed St. 1972, Chapter 123. This amendment explicitly expanded the definition of "trade" and "commerce" in G.L. c. 93A to include rental housing by amending §1(b) of G.L. c. 93A. In Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court noted that tenants are among those for whose benefit the Consumer Protection law was passed. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that: "The 1972 amendment to the definition of trade or commerce, adding express reference to the renting and leasing of services or property, did not expand, but only clarified, the scope of the words 'trade' or 'commerce'." Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 239 (1975). For a detailed discussion of the purposes of G.L. c. 93A, see Slaney v. Westwood Auto, 366 Mass. 688 (1975), and PMP Assocs. Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975).
193. G.L. c. 93A, §2(a) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." The definition of "act or practice" in the Attorney General's "General Regulations" was amended in 1975 to include "any threat or attempt to perform such act or practice." See 940 C.M.R. §3.01(1). The Attorney General has further declared that an act or practice is in violation of G.L. c. 93A, §2 if it is oppressive or otherwise unconscionable in any respect. 940 C.M.R. §3.16(1).
194. But see Henriquez v. Ahearn & Kocher, Northeast Housing Court, No. 18-H77-SP-4781 (Dalton, F.J. Apr. 23, 2019) where the court decided that an owner-occupant of a two-family home was not exempt because they were also a realtor.
195. G.L. c. 239, §8A. This is a very broad-based defense and includes Sanitary Code violations, breach of the warranty of habitability, breach of any material term of the rental agreement, or any violation of law related to the tenancy, such as a breach of quiet enjoyment or violation of the security deposit requirements. See Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207 (2015); Lawrence v. Osuaqwu, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 60 (2001); Amory Realty Trust v. Diaz, Boston Housing Court, 33820 (King, J., May 31, 1985).
196. See 940 C.M.R. § 3.17.
197. For example, a term that says that you waive the right to a rent abatement for excessive noise from construction. One Greenway PR LCC v. D & B Worldwide, Eastern Housing Court, No. 18-H84-SP-1120 (Theophilis, J. Sept. 18, 2018). Or a term that says you will pay your landlord’s attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome of the eviction case. Pelletier v. Arnold & Tripodes, Western Housing Court, No. 17-H79-CV-1076 (Fields, J. Nov. 2, 2018).
198. See Ndoro v. Torres, __N.E.3d__(2024)(landlord’s failure to repair substantial State Sanitary Code violations within fourteen days of notice was not reasonable and violated c. 93A).
199. G.L. c. 93A, §9.